We can define flexibility of thought as the ability to adapt to problems where it is necessary either to use new methods, techniques, knowledge or information, or to modify the existing method of dealing with the problem. In this sense, inflexibility of thought induced by prior experience has been demonstrated experimentally in two situations. In the first, participants can solve the problem with their existing knowledge and do so failing to notice that a superior, but less familiar, solution is available. In the second, a change in the task requires a novel procedure to be generated but experts have difficulty doing this because they cannot suppress the procedures they already possess.
A classic example of the first sort of harmful influence of prior experience on problem solution is the Einstellung (set) effect demonstrated by Luchins (1942) with the water–jug problem. Participants were given five introductory problems that could be solved using the same method. These were termed ‘Einstellung problems’ because the common solution method used for all of them was expected to induce a mental set for solving similar problems. The next two problems, termed ‘critical’, could be solved using the same method but a shorter and simpler solution was also possible. Over 80% of the participants failed to notice the shorter method and continued to use the longer method they had used successfully in the introductory problems. Luchins then presented an ‘extinction’ problem. This could not be solved using the original method but could be solved with the shorter method. Sixty four percent of the participants failed to solve the extinction (1-solution) problem. In comparison, only 5% of a control group who started with the critical (2-solution) problems and did not experience the introductory problems failed to solve the extinction problem (Luchins & Luchins, 1959). Thus, rather than improving their performance, the experimental group’s additional experience of the general problem situation blinded them to a simple solution which was found by almost everyone who had not had the extra experience. Luchins’ striking demonstration that experience can induce inflexibility of thought has been successfully repeated many times in a variety of formats (e.g., Atwood and Polson, 1976, Chen and Mo, 2004, Delaney et al., 2004, Lippman, 1996, Lovett and Anderson, 1996, McKelvie, 1990 and Woltz et al., 2000).
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Date: 2007-11-19 07:32 pm (UTC)A classic example of the first sort of harmful influence of prior experience on problem solution is the Einstellung (set) effect demonstrated by Luchins (1942) with the water–jug problem. Participants were given five introductory problems that could be solved using the same method. These were termed ‘Einstellung problems’ because the common solution method used for all of them was expected to induce a mental set for solving similar problems. The next two problems, termed ‘critical’, could be solved using the same method but a shorter and simpler solution was also possible. Over 80% of the participants failed to notice the shorter method and continued to use the longer method they had used successfully in the introductory problems. Luchins then presented an ‘extinction’ problem. This could not be solved using the original method but could be solved with the shorter method. Sixty four percent of the participants failed to solve the extinction (1-solution) problem. In comparison, only 5% of a control group who started with the critical (2-solution) problems and did not experience the introductory problems failed to solve the extinction problem (Luchins & Luchins, 1959). Thus, rather than improving their performance, the experimental group’s additional experience of the general problem situation blinded them to a simple solution which was found by almost everyone who had not had the extra experience. Luchins’ striking demonstration that experience can induce inflexibility of thought has been successfully repeated many times in a variety of formats (e.g., Atwood and Polson, 1976, Chen and Mo, 2004, Delaney et al., 2004, Lippman, 1996, Lovett and Anderson, 1996, McKelvie, 1990 and Woltz et al., 2000).