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Philip Tetlock, USB

This chapter summarizes some research results on expert political judgment that bear on debates among experimental psychologists over alleged departures from rationality in human judgment.
...well-known errors or biases:
(1) Overconfidence. [ a large gap b/w subjective probabilities and outcome ].
(2) Cognitive conservatism. [ experts are too slow to update their beliefs ].
(3) Certainty of hindsight. [ experts deny mistakes altogether ].
(4) Theory-driven standards of evidence and proof. [ experts impose higher standards of evidence and proof on dissonant claims than they do on consonant ones].
(5) Systematic evidence of incoherence in sbjective probability judgments. [ political observers are highly susceptible to the subadditivity effects. ... judge the likelihood of the whole to be less, sometimes far less, the the sum of its parts.

Why Foxes are better forecasters than Hedgehogs ( video, english).

P.E. Tetlock's talk at Long Now

"the more mediagenic the forecaster, the less likely his/her forecast is going to happen".
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One of the foundations for the work on expertise comes from the studies of chess masters by de Groot(1965) and Chase and Simon (1973). These seminal studies suggested that oni important key to achieving chess mastery seemed to lie in improved perceptual processing of the layout of chess pieces, rather than more rapid evaluation of legal chess moves. This perceptual skill results from years of practice. Whereas novices seem to rely on slow, conscious, deductive reasoning, experts seem to rely on fast, relatively unconscious processing - the chess master "sees" the right moves. Chase and Simon explained chess mastery in terms of the size of perceptual structures ( or chunks) that experts use relative to novices.
Exemplar Similarity and the Development of Automaticity. Thomas J. Palmeri. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Volume 23, Issue 2, March 1997, Pages 324-354
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How does the knowledge of experts affect their behaviour in situations that require unusual methods of dealing? One possibility, loosely originating in research on creativity and skill acquisition, is that an increase in expertise can lead to inflexibility of thought due to automation of procedures. Yet another possibility, based on expertise research, is that experts’ knowledge leads to flexibility of thought.
[the authors} tested these two possibilities in a series of experiments using the Einstellung (set) effect paradigm. Chess players tried to solve problems that had both a familiar but non-optimal solution and a better but less familiar one. The more familiar solution induced the Einstellung (set) effect even in experts, preventing them from finding the optimal solution. The presence of the non-optimal solution reduced experts’ problem solving ability was reduced to about that of players three standard deviations lower in skill level by the presence of the non-optimal solution. Inflexibility of thought induced by prior knowledge (i.e., the blocking effect of the familiar solution) was shown by experts but the more expert they were, the less prone they were to the effect. Inflexibility of experts is both reality and myth. But the greater the level of expertise, the more of a myth it becomes.
Merim Bilalić,Peter McLeoda and Fernand Gobet. 2007.
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Understanding what makes experts so good in their domain of expertise is a
traditional field of psychology, which goes back at least to the monograph of Binet (1894, 1966) on the psychology of skilled mental calculators and chess players (see Bryan and Harter, 1899; Cleveland, 1907; or Djakow et al., 1927 for other early examples). Recently, cognitive science has produced a wealth of empirical data on expertise, and several theoretical explanations have been proposed. In particular, research on expert memory has been flourishing, gathering a large amount of data, which have sufficient power to test current theories. It is timely then to compare some of the main contenders.
Fernand Gobet. Expert memory: a comparison of four theories. Cognition 66 (1998) 115–152.
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A refence to a psychology study on how novices and experts differ in their approach to problem solving.

http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/rgoldsto/cogsci/Chi.pdf

xposted at http://flying-bear.livejournal.com/270637.html

January 2023

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